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INTRODUCTION 
The European sovereign debt crisis began in October 2009 when 
Greece announced that the previous administration had severely 
misreported the country’s 2009 fiscal statistics to the European 
Union.1  Following this revelation, investors panicked as they became 
increasingly concerned about their investments in Greece, as well as 
other countries in the Eurozone with large amounts of debt: Portugal, 
Spain, and the Republic of Ireland.2 Subsequently, the three major 
credit rating agencies (“CRAs”)—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and 
Fitch—started to downgrade Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland’s 
ratings, thus signaling the beginning of the European sovereign debt 
crisis.3 

1. See Kevin Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: The Failing 
State In a Skewed Regime, 49 J. COMMON MIKT. STUD. 193, 199 (2011) (stating that George 
Papakonstantinou, the Greek finance minister, announced a tripling of the national debt from 
3.7% of GDP to 12.5% of GDP); see also Christopher Alessi, The Eurozone in Crisis, Council 
on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/world/eurozone-crisis/p22055?cid=rss-
fullfeed-the_eurozone_in_crisis-120211 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (explaining the origins of 
the crisis).  
2. Alessi, supra note 1 (explaining that instabilities in those markets that existed at this 
time of heightened investor caution); Paul Taylor, Anxiety Rises in Euro Zone Bond Market, 
THE N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/business/global/
01inside.html?ref=europeansovereigndebtcrisis (reporting on the panic spreading throughout 
bond markets).  
3. See generally Martin Mayer, Credit Rating Agencies in the Crosshairs, Brookings 
Institute (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/31-ratings-
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This crisis was pervasive enough to destroy the Irish economy, 
which had been booming for decades.4 Although Ireland experienced 
tremendous economic growth during the period from 1995 to 2000 
known as The Celtic Tiger, economic conditions had declined sharply 
when the Irish property bubble burst in 2009.5 Banks began 
scrambling for enough cash to stay afloat.6 Attempting to solve this 
problem domestically, the Irish government guaranteed the banks’ 
loans, converting their private bank debt into government debt.7 
This public sector debt became unsustainable for Ireland.8 
Ireland therefore had to ask the official sector, the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the European Union, for a bailout.9 After 

agencies-mayer (defining the “big three” rating agencies as Standard & Poor, Moody’s and 
Fitch, which are considered “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” by the 
United States government); Moody's cuts Irish debt down to junk, RTE NEWS (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.rte.ie/news/business/2011/0712/303559-bailout/ (anouncing the drop in ratings). 
See also Greece debt rating downgraded by third agency, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426085.stm (reporting that Moody’s was the final agency to 
downgrade Greece due to concerns about its ability to reduce its high levels of debt). 
4. Michael Busby, Luck of the Irish: How Ireland Has Become the Technological 
Wonderland of the European Union, 11 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 55, 62-63 (2002) 
(explaining Ireland’s market competitiveness); Michael Lewis, When Irish Eyes Are Crying, 
Vanity Fair, March 2011, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/
2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-201103.print (describing the post-collapse situation in Ireland 
attributing the bubble to a short-term demand for real estate). 
5. Lewis, supra note 4 (describing the post-collapse situation in Ireland). See generally 
GEORGE MORDAUNT, SHEPHERD’S PIE, 191 (2011) (setting forth his experience as a middle 
class Irish citizen both during the Tiger and after the crisis). 
6. See MORDAUNT, supra note 5 at 106 (chronicling his experience as a business owner 
in dealing with bank representatives); see also Lewis supra note 4 at 3 (contextualizing the 
exposure of Irish banks; for example, in 2007 they had lent 40% more to property developers 
in the failing construction industry than they had to the entire Irish population in 2000).  
7. See Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 (Act No. 18/2008) (Ir.), available 
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2008/en/act/pub/0018/sec0006.html#sec6 (providing the 
Irish Government’s legislative power to take action for financial recovery); Credit Institutions 
(Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme 2009 (S.I. No. 490/2009) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.ntma.ie/business-areas/funding-and-debt-management/eligible-liabilities-
guarantee-scheme/ [hereinafter ELG] (providing the text of the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee, 
Ireland’s legislative response).  
8.  John Murray-Brown & Neil Dennis, Ireland Guarantees Six Banks' Deposits, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, (describing the effect of the ELG on the Irish national debt); Irish 
deficit balloons after new bank bail-out, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-11441473 (reporting the Irish debt level as 32% of GDP); 
Michael Breen, The International Politics of Ireland's EU/IMF Bailout, Irish Studies In 
International Affairs 75, 8 (2012), available at http://doras.dcu.ie/17600/1/Breen_Ireland_EU-
IMF_doras.pdf behavior and deposits returned to Irish banks). 
9. Q&A: Irish Republic bail-out, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11766346 [hereinafter Bail-out Q&A] (announcing the 
general timeline and basic facts of the bail-out); see, e.g., Eurogroup ministers discuss Ireland 
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months of global speculation, Ireland signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MoU”) with these official sector institutions on 
December 7, 2010; the MoU specified the monetary amount of the 
assistance package, as well as the economic policies Ireland was 
required to implement.10 The final rescue package amounted to 
EU€85 billion, with EU€22.5 billion coming from the IMF.11 In order 
to receive periodic installments from the sovereign debt restructuring 
agreement, Ireland needed to implement a strict austerity program, 
which included cuts in social programs. For example, the MoU 
required cutting Disability Allowance from EU€192 to EU€186 per 
week and reducing Supplementary Welfare Allowance by EU€10 per 
week.12 Such costs came alongside the negative publicity Ireland had 
endured surrounding the bailout request and negotiations.13   

money crisis, CNN (Nov. 16, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/11/16/
ireland.economy/ (reporting that Ireland has no immediate funding and speculating about the 
pressure it was under to request a bailout); Neil Hume, Statement by the Eurogroup on Ireland, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2010), http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2010/11/16/406886/statement-by-the-
eurogroup-on-ireland/ (characterizing the lack of Ireland’s bailout request as a “standoff”). 
10. Ireland timeline, BBC NEWS,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/
1038669.stm (last visited March 8, 2014) (outlining the chronology of the bailout); see also 
Budget Ireland 2011: Highlights from Brian Lenihan's Budget Speech from 3:45pm, FINFACTS 
IRELAND (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1021198.shtml 
[hereinafter Budget Ireland 2011] (reporting on the Minister’s presentation of Budget 2011 as 
the first step to implement the fiscal consolidation disbursements of bailout funds were 
conditioned on). 
11. The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland (Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Eur. Comm'n, Occasional Paper No. 76, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/op76_en.htm 
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding] (providing Ireland’s responsibilities in order to 
receive the bailout); Bail-out Q&A, supra note 9 (announcing the general timeline and basic 
facts of the bail-out). 
12. Budget Ireland 2011, supra note 10 (reporting on the Minister’ presentation of 
Budget 2011); Irish Finance Bill 2011, FINFACTS IRELAND, (Jan. 21, 2011) 
http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1021463.shtml (reporting on the measures 
contained in the bill); see also Ireland timeline, BBC NEWS,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1038669.stm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
13. See, e.g., Ireland sets out record austerity budget, EURACTIV.COM, (Dec. 12, 2010), 
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/ireland-sets-record-austerity-bu-news-500390 
(assessing the Irish newly announced budget as “the toughest budget on record” and referring 
to the Irish government as a “puppet government” in light of the IMF’s control); Char le s  
Fore l l e  & David  Enr ich ,  Ireland's Fate Tied to Doomed Banks, Wall Street Journal 
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870450640457559
2360334457040 (reporting on the expanse of the Irish financial crisis); Bruno Waterfield, 
Ireland bail-out: 'gloves off' as Irish battered into submission over debt crisis, THE 
TELEGRAPH, (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/ireland/8150233/Ireland-bail-out-gloves-off-as-Irish-battered-into-submission-over-
debt-crisis.html (painting a negative picture of Ireland); Ciarian Hancock, Moody view of 
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 On November 14, 2013, Ireland announced that it would 
conclude the austerity program in December 2013 by fulfilling its 
commitments, and it would not extend the program by seeking 
precautionary credit.14 After the IMF and European Union conducted 
its twelfth review of Ireland’s progress, they approved the 
disbursement of their final payments, ending the program.15 The final 
review found that Ireland had consistently met deficit targets, 
successfully consolidated its debt, and implemented expenditure-
based fiscal adjustment, or austerity measures.16   
The IMF, the European Union, and the CRAs consider Ireland’s 
progress to be a “success.”17 In January 2014, Moody’s became the 
last credit rating agency to upgrade Ireland’s credit rating back to 
investment grade, as the country was preparing to satisfy its bailout 
requirements.18 The European Union’s review reported that, “Ireland 

Ireland shared by Central Bank, THE IRISH TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/financial-services/moody-view-of-ireland-shared-
by-central-bank-1.1623507 (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) (explaining that at the time, credit 
rating agency’s negative outlook on Ireland continued to deter potential investment). 
14. European Commission, Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland Autumn 2013 
Review, Occasional Papers 167 (Dec. 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/op167_en.htm [hereinafter 2013 
Review]; Suzanne Lynch & Harry McGee, Decision to exit bailout without precautionary 
credit ‘fully supported’ by EU-IMF, THE IRISH TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013) 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/decision-to-exit-bailout-without-precautionary-credit-
fully-supported-by-eu-imf-1.1594695 (reporting Minster for Finance Michael Noonan’s 
statement that it was in the best interest of Ireland and on the IMF and EU’s support of 
Ireland’s decision).   
15. See 2013 Review, supra note 14 (reporting their findings); European Commission, 
Commission publishes final review of programme for Ireland – gives green light for final 
disbursement, EUROPA.COM (Dec. 13, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-13-
1213_en.htm (reporting on the decisions of the EU and the IMF).  
16. See 2013 Review, supra note 14 (reporting Ireland’s fulfillment of its policy 
requirements and targets); European Commision, supra note 15 (reporting the resulting 
disbursement of funds).  
17.  European Commission, European Economic Forecast: Winter 2014, EUR. ECON. 2 
(2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/
2014/pdf/ee2_en.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Forecast] (“Ireland has successfully completed its 
financial assistance programme in December 2013”); see Ireland: Fourth Review Under the 
Extended Arrangement and Request for Rephasing of the Arrangement, IMF Country Report 
No. 11/356, 49 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/scr/2011/cr11356.pdf [hereinafter IMF Fourth Review] (characterizing the accompanying 
data as “concrete signs of recovery”). 
18. Arthur Beesley & John McManus, Ireland regains investment grade rating from 
Moody’s, THE IRISH TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/
economy/ireland-regains-investment-grade-rating-from-moody-s-1.1659667 (describing the 
increase as a “notch” and noting that Moody’s is the last of the three main credit rating 
agencies to give Ireland an investment level grade); Rating Action: Moody's upgrades 
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has performed very well under this EU/IMF programme, paving the 
way for successful completion of the arrangement.”19  
Many investors, economists, and citizens, however, question the 
appropriateness of any sort of praise due to the fact that the Irish 
economy continues to suffer.20 The European Union forecasted that 
Irish GDP will only grow by 1.8% in 2014, while unemployment is 
expected to remain at 11.9% and youth unemployment is at 26%. 21 
Germany, on the other hand, has an unemployment rate of 5%, and 
the European Union projected significant increases in German 
investment, pensions, and wages.22 The severity of Ireland’s 
economic conditions has forced over 397,500 people to leave Ireland 
since 2008, the highest number since the 1980s, in order to find jobs 
abroad.23  Additionally, the Republic is dotted with half-completed 

Ireland's sovereign ratings to Baa3/P-3: outlook changed to positive, MOODYS.COM (Jan. 17, 
2014), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades-Irelands-sovereign-ratings-to-
Baa3P-3-outlook-changed--PR_290559 [hereinafter Moody’s Rating] (announcing the ratings 
increase). “Investment grade” indicates that an asset has a relatively low risk of default, thus it 
refers to the level of ratings at which an investor would purchase an asset. See Moody’s Rating 
Symbols and Definitions (June 2009), available at https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/
AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf 
(explaining that while Moody’s does not officially rate sovereign debts “investment grade” or 
not, they do give them ratings parallel to other assets officially rated investment grade).  
19. 2013 Review, supra note 14, at 5; see also European Commission, supra note 15, 
(reporting on the decisions of the EU and the IMF). 
20. See, e.g., Stephen Castle, Setting Pace, Ireland Predicts December Exit from Bailout, 
THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/
world/europe/setting-pace-ireland-predicts-december-exit-from-bailout.html (discussing 
Ireland’s future obstacles); Fintan O’Toole, Ireland's Rebound Is European Blarney, THE N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/opinion/irelands-
rebound-is-european-blarney.html?src=me&ref=general&_r=0 (pointing out that such 
improvement is found in Ireland’s global economy while its domestic economy remains 
weak). 
21. 2014 Forecast, supra note 17, at 61 (reporting the European Union’s forecasts for 
Irish GDP growth and unemployment); Joana Taborda, Ireland Unemployment Rate, TRADING 
ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ireland/unemployment-rate (last visited April 
3, 2014) (providing youth unemployment statistics and projections); Suzanne Lynch, Europe 
forecasts lower growth rate for Ireland in 2014, THE IRISH TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-forecasts-lower-growth-rate-for-ireland-
in-2014-1.1704058 (contextualizing Ireland’s high 122.3% debt to GDP ratio for 2013).  
22. 2014 Forecast, supra note 17, at 57 (reporting the European Union’s projection for 
German GDP and expansionary fiscal stance); European Commission, German government 
projects 2015 GDP growth of 2%: European Commission report, THE ECON. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2014), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-04-08/news/48971275_1_gdp-econ
omic-growth-new-report (explaining the European Union’s positive outlook on Germany for 
2014).  
23. Aiden Sheehan, Emigration still hitting hard as 250 leave daily, INDEPENDENT.IE 
(Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/emigration-still-hitting-hard-as-250-
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building projects that were in progress when the crisis began.24 It is in 
the face of these dismal projections, that the IMF congratulates 
Ireland and the CRAs upgrade its credit ratings.25  
The disconnect between Ireland’s economic reality and the 
IMF’s understanding of Ireland’s economy is a product of the 
competing objectives of participating parties.26 The IMF bails out 
countries to stabilize the global economy; the measures it requires 
sovereigns to implement are focused on facilitating global recovery.27 
Consequently, it can go against the best interest of a nation to 
implement an IMF-led program.28 These measures are not designed to 
accomplish the domestic restoration that sovereigns with 
uncontrollable debt levels need.29 Sovereign debt lending needs a 
restructuring process that aligns the economic health of the debtor 
country with investor repayment.30 
This Note analyzes the cost of negotiating a sovereign debt 
restructuring when economic conditions have reached the point of 
near catastrophe. Using Ireland as a case study, this Note addresses 
the complexity of debt restructuring and proposes a contractual 
solution. Part I of this Note explains the general concepts of sovereign 
debt default and restructurings, as well as characteristics of the 
current restructuring process. Part II chronicles Ireland’s recent 
financial crisis and bailout program to demonstrate the costs of the 
current process and then compares statutory and contractual 
approaches to reforming the program. Finally, Part III advocates for 

leave-daily-29868486.html (calculating Irish emigration statistics as of 2013); see also Lewis, 
supra note 4 at 7 (explaining that Ireland had prided itself on the high levels of immigration 
into the country and was glad to be something other than “Europe’s poor outpost”). 
24. James Croke, Chuaigh ‘ar l’a - Debt of A Gaelsman: Ireland's Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, National and International Responses, 32 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 365, 378 (2012) 
(describing these partially completed residences as “ghost estates”); Lewis, supra note 4 
(remarking on the site of these projects).  
25. Paul Krugman, The IMF on Ireland, The Conscience of a Liberal, THE N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/the-imf-on-ireland/?_php=
true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (analyzing the IMF’s review of Ireland and noting that most of the 
economic growth is in the pharmaceutical industry which does not help most Irish citizens); 
IMF Fourth Review, supra note 17 (reviewing Ireland’s progress so far). 
26. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text (categorizing different forms of 
sovereign debt arrangements and the party interests they reflect).  
27. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (explaining the IMF and its goals).  
28. Infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (outlining the IMF’s interests which are 
separate from a sovereign’s). 
29. Infra notes 92-101 (showing that the two parties have different goals).  
30. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (showing the lack of aligned interests). 
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contractual reform by advocating for the adoption of a new term to 
“trigger” or designate the point at which a sovereign must begin to 
restructure.  
I. THE CURRENT WORLD OF SOVEREIGN DEBT, DEFAULT, & 
RESTRUCTURING 
This Part explains how sovereign debt defaults and 
restructurings are completed. Part A provides an overview of 
sovereign debt agreements, as well as default and restructuring 
mechanisms. Part I.B outlines characteristics of the current process 
and analyzes systemic costs. Part I.C contextualizes the official sector 
institutions’ involvement in the restructuring process. 
A. The Basics Of Sovereign Debt Default & Restructuring 
Sovereign debt is a fundraising mechanism by which countries 
gain access to necessary capital for domestic needs and projects.31 
This Section provides background information on the process of 
restructuring sovereign debt arrangements. Section A.1 discusses the 
different forms of debt agreements. Section A.2 explains the different 
courses of action available to a creditor when a sovereign is unable to 
make payments pursuant to these legal contracts. 
1. Sovereign Debt Agreements  
The sovereign that sells its debt is commonly referred to as the 
debtor country, or the borrower, while the purchasers are termed the 
lenders or the creditors.32 A country’s debt arrangements largely 
occur in four common forms.33 Bilateral loans are only between two 
parties; in sovereign debt, they are usually between two governments. 
These arrangements tend to be more akin to political accommodations 

31. See Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Approach, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 629, 629 (2003) (explaining that debt is the 
largest source of capital to developing countries in the past fifty years); Adam Brenneman, 
Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, Personal Bankruptcy, and A Comprehensive Contractual 
Solution, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 650 (2006) (providing background for the mechanism).  
32. See, e.g., Brenneman, supra note 31 (using the phrase “lender”); see William W. 
Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1, 12 (2004) (using the phrase “creditor”).  
33. See Caroline Gentile, The Market for Odious Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
151, 163 (Fall 2010); JOHN D. FINNERTY & DOUGLAS R. EMERY, DEBT MANAGEMENT: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, 31–32 (2001) (categorizing the forms debt agreements can take).  
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whereby the lender’s goal is to affect the borrower’s behavior.34 Thus, 
these agreements between governmental lenders and sovereign 
debtors are a way for the lender to secure influence rather than 
maximize economic profit.35  
Countries can also enter into private loans; which can be in the 
form of either commercial loans or sovereign bonds.36 Commercial 
loans are arranged between a sovereign and multiple commercial 
banks.37 They are subject to market forces, and the lending party is 
usually focused on operating at a profit.38  
  Sovereign bonds are sold in various capital markets, including 
the domestic market in the United States and the international 
Eurobond market.39 Institutional lenders, such as commercial banks, 
investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds, or mutual 
funds, purchase these bonds for profit maximization.40 Bondholders 
usually are the most diverse group of creditors.41 

34. Gentile, supra note 33 (explaining bilateral loans); A. Mechele Dickerson, A 
Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1008-09 
(2004) (explaining the importance of political considerations as compared to in other 
arrangements). 
35. See Gentile, supra note 33, at 163; see also Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A 
Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33-52 (Summer 2007), 
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol70/iss3/4 (explaining that these types of 
loans are frequently made to dictators). 
36. See Gentile, supra note 33, at 163 (explaining private loan agreements); James M. 
Hays II, The Sovereign Debt Dilemma, 75 Brook. L. Rev. 905, 906 (2010) (explaining the 
increase in sovereign bonds since the 1980s). 
37. See Gentile, supra note 33, at 165 (explaining how multiple commercial banks 
coordinate to form a “lending syndicate” which is managed by a large international bank). 
38. Id. at 167-68 (establishing the profit-seeking motives of these loans); Ronald J. 
Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A Creditor's Perspective, 11 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179 (2003) (arguing that previously the majority of private debt owed 
by sovereign governments came in this form and these creditors had similar concerns and 
interests). 
39. Gentile, supra note 33, at 167; Michael G. Kollo, Underwriter Competition and 
Gross Spreads in the Eurobond Market, EUR. CENT. BANK, Working Paper Series No. 550, 9-
12 (Nov. 2005), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp550.pdf 
(providing an example by analyzing competition in the Eurobond market). 
40. See Hays II, supra note 36, at 906 (2010) (explaining that the global debt crisis of the 
1980s also spurred the emergence of a secondary market for bonds); Gentile, supra note 33, at 
163 (providing further background information).  
41. See Steven L. Schwarcz, "Idiot's Guide" to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1189, 1190-91 (2004) (discussing issues of sovereign debt focusing on state-issued 
bonds); see Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 629 (pointing out sovereign bond restructuring 
has gained in importance due to the increase in bonds and restructuring complications they 
present).  
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  Finally, a country may receive a multi-lateral loan, where 
certain multinational organizations lend to the country in order to 
attempt to minimize disruption to the global economy and prevent 
default after an economic crisis.42 Such organizations make up the 
official sector, which includes global organizations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, as well as regional ones, such as the European 
Union and the European Central Bank in the case of Ireland. As 
public, non-party institutions, they have inherently different interests 
that motivate their participation in the process.43 These institutions do 
not make financial decisions; they generally are advocating global 
political economic policies.44 For example, the IMF’s overarching 
priority is to further economic global development and stability.45    
2. Sovereign Debt Default & Restructuring 
A sovereign debt crisis occurs when the debtor country cannot 
make payments to its lenders because its debt burden is 
unsustainable.46 When a debtor is unable to meet its legal repayment 
obligation, it defaults.47 When a default occurs or appears imminent, a 
sovereign will usually attempt to restructure its debt.48  The options 

42. See Gentile, supra note 33, at 165 (explaining how multiple commercial banks 
coordinate to form a “lending syndicate” which is managed by a large international bank); see, 
e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text (demonstrating when in the process the multi-lateral 
loans are typically given). 
43. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (explaining the IMF’s priorities and 
motivations); see also Hays II, supra note 36, at 919 (2010) (highlighting the IMF’s inability 
to properly solve financial crises as well).  
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (establishing that due to the IMF’s interest 
in the overall global economy and lack of individual financial interest,  its decisions are not 
financial).  
45. Id.; see Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or 
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1483, 1490-91 (2004) (the IMF intervenes so as to 
prevent contagion by bailing out the sovereigns). 
46. Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 630 (explaining how amassing large amounts of 
debt can cause a country to default).  Scholars often draw a parallel to domestic corporate 
bankruptcy which occurs when a private company fails to make payments on its commercial 
debt or when its liabilities exceed its assets.  See, e.g., Gentile, supra note 33 (drawing a 
parallel between sovereign debt and commercial bankruptcy.) However, unlike in commercial 
debt there are no warning signs such as the amount of overdrafts on account, financial 
statements showing deteriorating conditions, and changing in purchasing habits. See Pamela S. 
Gotcher, Guide to Commercial Banking Law, Sheshunoff Information Services Vol. I, 4/11 
(1989) (suggesting potential indicators of an oncoming crisis).  
47. Supra note 46 and accompanying text (outlining the causes of defaults).  
48. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts, IMF Paper No. 
12/203, 8 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf 
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for a restructuring generally include some combination of: (1) 
rescheduling payments to lenders; (2) receiving external relief or debt 
reduction; and/or (3) obtaining a fresh infusion of money into its 
economy, such as a bailout.49 Both debt reschedulings and debt 
reductions involve a “haircut,” which is a decrease in the amount of 
repayment owed to creditors as a result of restructuring.50 
Debt rescheduling lengthens the maturities of the old debt.51 This 
usually entails a decrease in interest rates, which lessens the overall 
value of repayment.52 Reschedulings offer relief to the sovereign 
because they shift payments into the future.53 Debt reduction, on the 
other hand, is a decrease in the actual face value of the agreements.54 
Any form of external relief requires both parties to agree to alter to 
the debt agreement.55  
If a country is unable to re-negotiate its agreement in this way, it 
will either default or ask for a bailout. A bailout is money offered in 
loans, bonds, stocks, or cash to prevent serious economic 
consequences that accompany a default.56 While they often contain 

(discussing the basic timeline); Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 657 (providing a brief 
overview of restructuring techniques). 
49. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best 
Interest of Creditors, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2004) (explaining that sovereigns generally to 
the reschedule of obligations or reduce them rather than repudiating their agreements 
completely); Das et al., supra note 48 (explaining different technical components of 
restructuring). 
50. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 18 (defining “haircut” as a reduction in the 
interest rate or the principal amount); Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the 
International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 177, 185 (2005) (defining “haircut” as 
debt reduction).  
51. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 657; Das et al., supra note 48, at 7 
(explaining rescheduling). 
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing explanation of the effects of 
rescheduling on overall repayment).  
53. See Das et al., supra note 48 (providing an explanation of debt rescheduling). 
54. See id. (providing an explanation of debt reduction).  
55. See id. (explaining the process by which these techniques are implemented). See 
generally Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Gathering Storm: Contingent Liabilities in a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Aug. 21, 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2292669 (pointing out that there is no procedure in place which necessitates these 
discussions). 
56. Bailout, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
b/bailout.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2014) (defining “bailout” [a] situation in which a business, 
individual or government offers money to a failing business in order to prevent the 
consequences that arise from a business's downfall taking the form of loans, bonds, stocks or 
cash; they may or may not require reimbursement); see also Sedlak, supra note 45, at 1487 
(contrasting sovereign default with domestic bankruptcy). 
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some debt reduction, bailouts differ from external relief measures 
because they provide the sovereign with additional funds to avoid 
default, while external relief reduces the amount the sovereign already 
owes.57 Since debt agreements do not typically contain procedures for 
restructuring, any combination of rescheduling, external relief, or 
bailout requires negotiations.58  
B. The Nature Of Sovereign Debt Default & Restructuring  
Economic and political crises usually impede a sovereign’s 
ability to make debt payments, forcing it to negotiate with its 
creditors.59 Restructuring negotiations between the borrower and 
lender typically have the dual purpose of modifying the terms of the 
loan and the borrower’s behavior.60 The negotiating period is usually 
public, expensive, and as in the Irish case, can leave the country 
vulnerable to further economic harms by making it harder for a 
country to re-enter capital markets as a result of the damage to its 
economic reputation.61 Section B.1 identifies the competing interests 
inherent to debt restructuring that can prolong and complicate the 
process. Section B.2 explains how the timing of a restructuring affects 
the severity of an economic crisis in both quantifiable expenses and 
the effect on a sovereign’s reputation.  

57.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text (defining a "bailout"); supra notes 51-54 
and accompanying text (explaining external relief measures). 
58. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 55 (providing an example of missing procedural 
details); see also Sebastian Dellepiane Avellaneda & Niamh Hardiman, The European Context 
of Ireland’s Economic Crisis, UCD Dublin European Institute Working Paper 10-3, 17 (Aug. 
2010) (attributing a lot of Ireland’s poor policy choices to the fact that it did not have any 
planned policy of what to do in terms of crisis). 
59. Government statement on request for support, RTE NEWS (Nov. 21, 2010), 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1121/294654-economy3/ (reporting the beginning of negotiations 
in the Irish case in 2010). See generally Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 55 (explaining the need 
for negotiation). 
60. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 CHI. J. 
INT'L L. 287, 298 (2005) (explaining that the IMF frequently require austerity measures on the 
part of the sovereign); supra notes 130-135and accompanying text (detailing Ireland’s terms 
with the IMF). 
61. Bratton & Gulati,  supra note 49, at 13 (explaining that in spite of these stigmatizing 
effects, there is concern that a sovereign may strategically default and stop the accruing of 
interest when it is unnecessary but beneficial to default); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, 
Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1043, 1045 (2004) (arguing that that current check against strategic defaults is the 
prohibitively long and expensive process of negotiating a restructuring with the debt holders 
often caused by holdout creditors).   
2014]              NOT JUST THE LUCK OF THE IRISH 1871 

1.  The Complexity of Debt Restructuring Negotiations 
Debt restructuring negotiations are complicated, as creditors’ 
interests are often not aligned with the sovereign’s or each other’s.62  
Many sovereign debt contracts currently contain unanimous action 
clauses ("UACs"), which require that every creditor, regardless of its 
holdings, be in complete agreement about any changes, such as debt 
reductions or reschedulings.63 Since a debtor usually only has the 
value to satisfy some debts, this creates perverse interests among 
creditors who are competing for payment from the country’s limited 
funds.64 
Creditors’ non-aligned interests further complicate 
restructurings. The makeup of lenders has become increasingly 
diverse usually including a combination of national governments, the 
IMF, and private financial institutions, such as banks and mutual 
funds; these parties have competing interests and priorities in 
sovereign lending.65 National governments have a variety of interests 
depending on their relationship with the debtor. For example, the 
United Kingdom invested heavily in Irish assets and markets because 
Ireland is a major market for many British products.66 Meanwhile, the 
IMF’s priority is to quickly stabilize the global economy by ensuring 
a sovereign repays its lenders and a crisis does not become 
contagious.67 Banks and mutual funds are motivated strictly by 

62. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 4 (highlighting the difficulty for a sovereign to 
obtain unanimous intent in light of a dispersed creditor base); Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, 
Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 981 
(2007) (explaining how a borrower’s insolvency intensifies the competing interests of creditors 
because the sovereign doesn’t have enough funds to satisfy all debts). 
63. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 3 (stating that use of this boilerplate term is a 
significant barrier to the success of negotiations); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, (stating that 
this was the case until Mexico’s 2003 bond issuance).   
64. See Gulati & Triantis, supra note 62, at 981 (explaining creditors’ perverse interests 
in light of a sovereign’s insolvency where it doesn’t have enough funds to satisfy all debts); id. 
(citing examples of creditors protecting their individual interests).  
65. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing the varying instruments). 
66. MATT COOPER, HOW IRELAND REALLY WENT BUST 120-21 (2011) (providing 
context to the British exposure to Irish banks). See generally TIM PAT COOGAN, IRELAND IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2003) (describing Ireland’s history as an sopen economy heavily 
based on trade). 
67. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 62, at 995 (“The IMF's not-for-profit status and its 
commitment to the economic development of its members also assure creditors that the Fund is 
likely to assume the lead role in restructurings”); see also Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 
195 (arguing that its current mission is not the one it was set up to pursue). See generally, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring—Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal 
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profits; therefore, they are interested in ensuring that these debts not 
only are repaid but that they generate maximum interest.68 Thus, these 
institutions are less likely to forgive debt for political or other non-
financial reasons.69 
While amending a contract with potentially thousands of 
creditors around the world can be an uphill battle, one of the biggest 
disruptions to debt restructurings is holdout creditors.70  The UAC 
motivates these creditors to refuse to cooperate in restructuring plans 
put forth by the sovereign. 71 These holdouts are legally protected by 
the UAC, which effectively guarantees their repayment and ensures 
no restructuring can move forward without their agreement.72 In 
addition to withholding support in hopes of receiving better payment, 
some holdouts take sovereigns to court demanding full repayment.73 
The UAC further complicates the restructuring process because 
creditors who refuse to make any concessions threaten the orderliness 
of, and often prolong negotiations.74 
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and Policy Framework, IMF (2013) [hereinafter IMF Policy] (outlining the IMF’s procedure 
in sovereign debt restructurings). 
68. Dickerson, supra note 34, at 1009 (explaining the financial priorities of these 
creditors; see Silverman & Deveno, supra note 38 (arguing that restructurings were less 
complicated when financial institutions were the majority of creditors due to their aligned 
financial interests). 
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (profiling these institutional lenders).  
70. See Samuel E. Goldman, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-
Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 159, 173-174 (2000) 
(discussing potential solutions to this problem); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 61, at 1045 (2004) 
(discussing those holdout creditors known as “vulture funds”; see also, Anna Gelpern, 
Building A Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1116-117 
(2004) (explaining how as a sovereign funds start to run out, lenders unsure of their place in 
line or their “priority” in getting paid relative to one another can also stall negotiations). 
71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (establishing the motivation of holdout 
creditors). 
72. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 61, at 1047 (arguing that by holdout creditors 
enforcing their legal rights, they serve as an important check on opportunistic defaults); Anne 
Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Address at the National Economists' Club Annual Members' Dinner American 
Enterprise Institute (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2001/112601.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (arguing that a major problem with 
holdout creditors is created by the fact that individual bondholders have more legal leverage in 
restructuring than banks, and are subject to less regulation).  
73. See, e.g., Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998), rev'd sub nom. Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 
1999); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 
1985) [hereinafter Allied II].   
74. See Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach 
to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IMF (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/
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2. The Systemic Costs to the Sovereign  
The current restructuring process is convoluted. The associated 
economic and reputational costs often cause sovereigns to delay 
restructuring when it is in their interest to restructure early and 
increase their chances of avoiding a default.75 Negotiations are costly 
because of their direct expenses and the further external harms to 
which they expose the sovereign. For example, Greece endured an 
extremely protracted negotiation process from December 2009 to 
May 2010 as Germany and other countries strongly opposed any 
financial assistance from the European Union.76 Consequently, 
although it serves the debtor’s interest to restructure early, the costs of 
the current system often cause sovereigns to try to avoid restructuring 
debts when they are facing liquidity problems.77  
One of the biggest harms is the negative effect on a sovereign’s 
economic reputation; this makes future fundraising difficult when the 
sovereign eventually returns to international markets.78 The 
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external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm [hereinafter SDRM 2002] (acknowledging that 
difficulty in securing collective action makes sovereigns extremely reluctant to restructure 
their debt); see also Arora & Caminal supra note 31, at 630 (stressing the need for a rethinking 
of the current procedures).  
75. Dickerson, supra note 34, at 1007 (explaining that sovereigns also avoid debt 
restructurings because of their concern that default signals that the sovereign is not 
creditworthy and that such a signal diminishes a sovereign's reputation in, and access to, 
international capital markets, of uncertainty whether the restructuring will be successful); 
Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727, 732 (2007) 
(arguing that the lack of orderly workouts can cause creditors to reduce the amount of credit 
available in general); Kreuger, supra note 74 (explaining the problems of delayed sovereign 
debt restructurings). 
76. Greece Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
country_profiles/1014812.stm (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (chronicling the Greek situation); 
'Detrimental to the Euro': European Central Bank Blasts Merkel on Greece, SPIEGAL ONLINE 
(Mar. 24 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/detrimental-to-the-euro-european-
central-bank-blasts-merkel-on-greece-a-685519.html (explaining German chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s position that the IMF not the European Union should provide Greece with financial 
aid). 
77. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 61, at 19 (advocating for early restructurings as they 
protects a sovereign’s future access to capital); Dickerson, supra note 34, at 998 (2004) 
(arguing that sovereigns delay both defaulting debts and restructuring those debts with their 
creditors because of the political and economic ramifications associated with default); see 
SDRM 2002, supra note 74 (explaining the delay is mainly the result of government decisions 
and political factors); see infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (detailing the structural 
complexities of negations). 
78. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 61, at 13 (“Access to funding is critical for the 
economic rehabilitation: a financially troubled State will need fresh working capital during 
restructuring, so that critical governmental functions don't collapse.”); see Arora & Caminal, 
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negotiations themselves, as well as the reactions of other parties, such 
as CRAs, garner dramatic public attention.79 Severe drops in market 
confidence usually accompany such notice as investors frequently 
cash in their investments, further exacerbating the liquidity crisis.80 In 
such a situation, a country’s liquidity can plummet before it has a 
chance to restructure.81 Scholars argue that despite the austerity 
measures that the IMF requires sovereigns to impose, the effect on 
future access to borrowing is the biggest cost of a default because 
investors are reluctant to invest in countries that have defaulted for 
fear it will happen again.82  
 Negotiations are also inherently expensive.83 First, during a 
restructuring trade flows generally shrink, as does foreign 
investment.84 Secondly, sovereigns have to pay their financial and 

supra note 31, at 642 (explaining that this financing can be obtained from two main sources: 
(1) official financing (bailouts) or (2) private sector (bail-ins)). 
79. See, e.g., Moody's cuts Irish debt down to junk, RTE NEWS, July 12, 2011 
(anouncing the drop Ireland’s debt ratings); Hancock, supra note 13 (reporting the persuasive 
effects of the rating on Ireland’s credit outlook). See generally Mayer, supra note 3 (arguing 
that the CRAs exacerbated the financial crisis in 2008 both in their ratings before and after the 
bubble bursts). 
80. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 61, at 14 (explaining this concept as part of a reputation 
theory of sovereign debt); Joanna Pagones, Note, The European Union’s Response to the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis: Its Effect on Labor Relations in Greece, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1517, 
1520-32 (2013) (describing the impact of falls in confidence in a sovereign). 
81. Infra notes 123-139 and accompanying text (illustrating this result in the Irish case).  
82. See Miguel Fuentes & Diego Saravia, “Sovereign Defaulters: Do International 
Capital Markets Punish Them?", J. DEV. ECON. 336, 336–47 (2010), available at 
http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/dt_314b.pdf (analyzing foreign investment data on default 
and concluding that non-investment does serve as form of punishment for defaulting 
countries); Bratton & Gulati, supra note 61, at 14 (explaining this concept as part of a 
reputation theory of sovereign debt). See generally Pagones, supra note 80, at 1520-32 
(describing the impact of falls in confidence in a sovereign).  
83. Das et al., supra note 48, at 65-66 (pointing out the administrative costs of a 
restructuring); see also Dickerson, supra note 34, at 998 (explaining that sovereign debt 
restructurings are costly and inefficient partly because sovereigns do not begin renegotiate 
debts earlier). 
84. Das et al., supra note 48, at 61-65 (concluding that recent studies of empirical data 
agree that debt crisis years are associated with a drop in GDP of between 2 and 5% per year 
and that this relationships is causal, rather than correlative); STURZENEGGER ET AL., DEBT 
DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 51-52 (2006) (conducting a statistical 
analysis of a sample of defaults to find that a defaulting country that is also experiencing a 
banking crisis will suffer output losses of 1.6% leading to an output level of 4.5% below five 
years after the crisis). See generally Fuentes & Saravia, supra note 82, at 336–347 (2010), 
available at http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/dt_314b.pdf (establishing this relationship 
between crisis and investment).  
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legal advisors for negotiating and communicating with bondholders.85 
In addition to these direct expenses, debtors are also usually required 
to pay a restructuring fee, which is a percentage of the total 
restructured amount.86 These costs further reduce a debtor’s 
liquidity.87 Thus, the longer it takes for the parties to come to an 
agreement, the more disruptive and severe the recession becomes.88 
Aside from the monetary costs, the public perception of a 
country in the midst of restructuring negotiations can exacerbate a 
crisis. CRAs begin to lower a country’s credit ratings during 
negotiations, which decreases its current and future access to capital 
markets.89 Consequently, the sovereign’s debt value is lower, 
exposing the sovereign to predatory holdouts, known as vulture funds, 
who purchase debt at this lowered price and demand payment at face 
value.90 These prohibitive costs of negotiation often cause a sovereign 
to delay restructuring.91 
C. The IMF’s Current Role in Restructurings 
This Section examines the IMF’s participation in sovereign debt 
restructurings, as well as frequent criticisms of the organization and 
its operation. Section C.1 explains the argument that IMF lending is 

85. Das et al., supra note 48, at 66 (detailing a sovereign’s substantial expenses from 
financial and legal advisors); LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE 
FOR AD HOC MACHINERY, 129 (2003) (surveying trends in restructuring fees).  
86. See RIEFFEL, supra note 85 (reporting findings that this fee tends to be of between 
0.25 % and 2.25 % of the amounts restructured).  
87. Das et al., supra note 48, at 45-55 (concluding from various survey results that the 
decrease in a sovereign’s output and trade flows depends on the duration of arrears and 
negotiations); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 70, at 1089 (explaining that disruptions lengthen 
time and thereby increase associated costs and continue to deplete the sovereign’s funds); 
Goldman, supra note 70, at 164 (explaining that longer negotiations signal that the sovereign 
cannot pay and thus encourages increased holdout behavior).  
88. See infra note 113 (detailing the positive relationship between negotiation cost and 
length). 
89. Marilyn Blumberg Cane et. al., Below Investment Grade and Above the Law: A Past, 
Present and Future Look at the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies, 17 Fordham J. Corp. 
& Fin. L. 1063, 1066 (2012) (stating that “millions of investors across the world rely on rating 
agencies to help assess the creditworthiness of particular financial instruments”); see, e.g., 
Hancock, supra note 13 (reporting the persuasive effects of the rating on Ireland’s credit 
outlook). 
90. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 61, at 1071 (explaining the strategy of vulture 
funds); Goldman, supra note 70 (describing the difficulties for sovereign debtors and other 
creditors created by holdout litigation). 
91. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (identifying this tendency in sovereigns); 
supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (detailing these costs).  
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politically motivated due to its internal system of voting and 
governance. Section C.2 summarizes arguments that the IMF’s 
current level of involvement promotes moral hazard.  
1. The IMF’s Mission and Political Pressure 
The IMF was founded in December 1945 when the first 
members, the forty-five parties at the Bretton Woods conference, 
signed the Articles of Agreement; it began operations on March 1, 
1947.92 Initially, the IMF was created to oversee the rules on 
international monetary relations agreed on at Bretton Woods.93 It was 
also created as a credit union where members would contribute an 
amount of money for the power to draw on the fund if they needed 
financial assistance.94 
The IMF states that its primary goal is to stabilize the 
international financial system.95 Like most official sector 
organizations, the IMF has an unequal structure of governance.96 Each 
member country is required to pay an assigned “quota,” which 
reflects the size of its economy.97 Members also vote on the IMF’s 

92. Cooperation and reconstruction, IMF 1944–71,  https://www.imf.org/external/about/
histcoop.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (chronicling the foundation of the IMF); Tarullo, supra 
note 60, at 289-92 (explaining the changes in the role IMF over time). 
93. Cooperation and reconstruction, IMF 1944–71,  https://www.imf.org/external/
about/histcoop.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (explaining the formation of the IMF and its 
founding purposes); Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt 
Workouts, 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 333, 334 (2005). 
(asserting that the creation of the IMF gave Creditor Governments new methods through 
which to influence the behavior of sovereign debtors). 
94. Tarullo, supra note 60, at 289-92 (discussing how the IMF used primarily serve as an 
international credit union as opposed to the economic monitoring and policy roles it has seen 
taken on); Cooperation and reconstruction, IMF 1944–71,  https://www.imf.org/external/
about/histcoop.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (explaining early IMF operations and stating that 
France was the first member to borrower from the IMF). 
95. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 3. (arguing that the IMF acts to satisfy political 
goals of stability, making it predictable for the creditors to anticipate and thus removing any 
incentive on their part to negotiate); Tarullo, supra note 60, at 309 (arguing that the impact of 
the political foundation of the Fund should not be overemphasized).  
96. See Tarullo, supra note 60, at 292 (explaining that the discrepancy in voting power in 
the IMF); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 67, at 198 (pointing out the concern, that as politicized 
institution, the IMF could be too liberal in offering its assistance); see also IMF Executive 
Directors and Voting Power, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2014) [hereinafter IMF Voting] (providing a breakdown of the amount of 
votes held per country). 
97. FactSheet: IMF Quotas, IMF (Mar. 25, 2014), available at https://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm [hereinafter IMF Quotas] (explaining generally 
how quotas are determined and how a member's quota determines that country’s financial and 
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decisions and policies; a member’s voting power reflects its financial 
contribution.98 Thus, a small group of wealthy nations has a dominant 
voting position: twenty-two out of the 184 member countries hold 
sixty percent of the votes.99  
As a public institutional actor, the IMF usually is not party to the 
initial sovereign debt contract and does not automatically have a legal 
claim when a sovereign defaults.100 Consequently, it does not 
participate in restructurings to make strictly financial decisions. 
Instead, with powerful shareholders, it can serve as a catalyst for 
lenders to extend relief in the restructuring process and to stabilize 
markets.101 Critics argue that the IMF’s structure allows global 
politics to dictate restructurings by enabling powerful members to 
create IMF policies in light of their domestic interests.102 The Irish 
negotiations with the IMF provide an apt example of this. Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom are all in the group of five countries 
with the highest number of votes in the IMF. They also are major 
Irish creditors.103 Thus, it is not surprising that the IMF’s assistance 

organizational relationship with the IMF); see also Tarullo, supra note 60, at 289-92 
(discussing how the IMF formerly served as an international credit union as opposed to its 
additional economic monitoring and policy roles).  
98. See IMF Voting, supra note 96 (explaining the voting power in the IMF); IMF 
Quotas, supra note 97 (explaining the economic basis for power within the IMF). 
99. Tarullo, supra note 60, at 292 (contextualizing the votes by pointing out that the 
United States, with over seventeen percent of the total voting power has the single greatest 
number of votes). But see Paul R. Masson & Michael Mussa, The Role of the IMF: Financing 
and Its Interactions with Adjustment and Surveillance, IMF Pamphlet Series No 50 (1995) 
(arguing the Fund has concentrated its surveillance on countries that are likely to need its 
help).  
100. See Gulati & Triantis, supra note 63, at 977-78 (positing that despite the security 
that official sector institutions enjoy, there is no legal basis for it). See generally, W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (explaining the legal 
mechanisms of sovereign debt contracts).  
101. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 63, at 994 (explaining this power as a function of the 
IMF’s “international status and political clout”); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 67, at 182-83 
(arguing that the IMF is disproportionally sensitive to creditor disputes at the expense of other 
economic issues such as the sovereign’s domestic recovery). 
102. See Tarullo, supra note 60, at 288-89 (arguing that because everyone will try to 
avoid generalized financial distress, the IMF has a bias in favor of lending money to 
countries).  
103. IMF Voting, supra note 96 (providing a breakdown of the amount of votes held per 
country); see also Tarullo, supra note 60, at 309 (arguing that such a structure gives the IMF a 
political foundation). 
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was conditional on Ireland implementing severe financial reforms to 
ensure creditor repayment.104  
2. The IMF & Moral Hazard 
Critics also argue that the IMF’s consistent involvement in 
sovereign debt restructurings creates moral hazard.105 Moral hazard 
refers to the tendency of actors who are protected from the 
consequences of risky behavior to use less caution in their financial 
decisions.106 This inclination can be found on both the creditor and 
sovereign sides of debt lending; sovereigns who expect the official 
sector to bail them out have less incentive to adopt prudent, economic 
strategies.107 Similarly, creditors who anticipate being protected from 
a default may not lend as carefully.108  
Many scholars also argue that IMF bailouts and austerity 
programs further incentivize holdout creditors by making it rational 
for them to wait for a better deal.109 Experts argue that the IMF’s role 
as the lender of last resort increases the frequency of defaults because 
it reduces creditors’ incentives to make concessions that would result 
in a haircut.110 In other words, the reliability of an eventual IMF 

104. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (explaining how the influence of 
powerful IMF members, Germany, France and U.K. prevented the IMF from creating a bailout 
that left banks and other investors exposed).   
105. Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 1194 (defining moral hazard); Dickerson, supra note 
34, at 1010 (explaining the view that the prospect of an IMF support package arguably creates 
a moral hazard risk by encouraging countries both to maintain domestic economic policies that 
are not fiscally sound and to borrow recklessly from private capital markets).   
106. Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 1194 (acknowledging the varying definitions of moral 
hazard across different disciplines); see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an 
Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 653 (1985) (defining moral hazard as “the 
deliberate efforts by the insured to bring about the insured event, as when the owner of life 
insurance commits suicide). 
107. Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 1194 (explaining that moral hazard on both lender and 
sovereign sides); Dickerson, supra note 34, at 1010 (providing an example of such behavior on 
the sovereign’s side). 
108. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 34 (arguing that the prospect of a support package 
from the IMF arguably encourages creditors to take excessive risks and lend recklessly); 
Tarullo, supra note 60, at 288 (establishing the frequency of IMF bailouts). 
109. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (establishing the incentives for 
holdout creditors once they know repayment is legally inevitable); Bratton & Gulati, supra 
note 49 (explaining that at the bottom line, the sovereign must cater to the creditors, since it 
pays them only for the purpose of the potential for future arrangements). 
110. See, e.g., Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 651; Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, 
at 3 (both arguing that in the anticipation of an official sector bail out, creditors see no benefit 
in accepting a restructuring contract).  
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bailout incentivizes creditors to force the debtor into default in order 
to secure full repayment through the bailout.111  
II. REFORMING SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: WHY IT 
IS NEEDED AND HOW TO DO IT 
This Part examines the sovereign debt restructuring process and 
discusses proposed reforms. Part II.A uses Ireland as a case study of 
the current system of restructuring highlighting the immense costs 
Ireland has endured. Part II.B compares the two main types of 
sovereign debt reforms: statutory and contractual. 
A. The Republic of Ireland: A Painful Illustration of the Current 
Landscape of Sovereign Debt 
This Section examines Ireland’s economic crisis and its 
restructuring process. Section A.1 discusses the causes of the crisis, 
Ireland’s attempts to avoid restructuring through the Eligible 
Liabilities Guarantee (“ELG”), and the competing interests present in 
the negotiations with the European Union and the IMF. Section A.2 
explains the austerity program through which the European Union 
and the IMF provided financial assistance. Section A.3 examines the 
current state of Ireland now that it has completed its restructuring 
through the austerity program. 
1. The Irish Economic Slowdown 
The Irish economy is inherently vulnerable to global economic 
disruptions because it is predominantly an export economy.112 During 
the increased wealth and prosperity of the Celtic Tiger, new job 
opportunities in the growing information technology industry caused 
property values to rise exponentially.113 This created an Irish property 

 
112. See generally DIARMAID FERRITER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRELAND (2005); 
COOGAN, supra note 66 (accrediting this vulnerability to when Ireland wanted to join the 
European Economic Community (“EEC”) in the 1960s and opened its economy to trade in 
order to improve its chances of admission; however as the economy became more open it was 
also became more vulnerable to global economic fluctuations). 
113. Lewis, supra note 5 (attributing the bubble to the foreign residents who came to 
work in the growing technology industry and rented homes creating a short-term demand for 
real estate; thus when the economy slowed down and they left, property developers were left 
with many vacant and many partly completed residences); Busby, supra note 4, at 62-63 
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bubble similar to the one experienced in the United States in 2007; 
when the Irish housing bubble burst in 2008, it sent the entire 
economy reeling.114 The banks began to see the value of their assets 
dwindle, and the six major Irish banks (Allied Irish Bank, Bank of 
Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life & Permanent, Irish Nationwide 
Building Society, and Educational Building Society) were on the 
brink of default.115 If these banks defaulted, Ireland’s entire economy 
was in jeopardy of a default.116  
First, Ireland attempted to resolve its economic crisis through 
legislation instead of trying to restructure.117 In December 2009, the 
Irish government guaranteed of all the banking sector’s loans with the 
Eligible Liabilities Guarantee.118 With the ELG, the government 
transformed private bank debt into sovereign debt to be borne by the 
Republic itself.119 This, unfortunately, was the decision that sealed 
Ireland’s fate.120 Transforming private sector debt into public sector 

(explaining Ireland’s market competitiveness in attracting investment from the technological 
sector). 
114. James Croke, Chuaigh Ár Lá - Debt of A Gaelsman: Ireland's Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, National and International Responses, 32 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 365, 378 (2012) 
(stating that Ireland's GDP, which grew every year since 1993, declined by 3.5% in 2008 and 
is expected to contract by approximately 13.5% from 2008 through 2010); see also, Busby, 
supra note 4, at 63-64 (pointing out Ireland’s economic vulnerability as early as 2002); 
Pagones, supra note 80, at 1531 (describing Ireland’s budget deficit as part of the broader 
Eurozone crisis). 
115. John Murray-Brown & Neil Dennis, Ireland Guarantees Six Banks' Deposits, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008 (announcing the government’s decision); COOPER, supra note 626, at 9 
(explaining the economic outlook among Irish officials at the time). 
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (providing context for the widespread 
economic panic). 
117. Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008, supra note 7, § 6(4) (providing the 
Irish Government’s legislative power to take action for financial recovery); ELG, supra note 7 
(providing the text of the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee, Ireland’s legislative response).  
118. Murray-Brown & Dennis, supra note 115 (announcing the Irish government’s 
decision); see also COOPER, supra note 66, at 91, 161 (explaining the economic outlook 
among Irish officials at the time). 
119. Murray-Brown & Dennis, supra note 115 (reporting on this transformation of debt); 
COOPER, supra note 66, at 121 (explaining that the ELG came into effect on December 9, 2009 
at midnight providing an unconditional and irrevocable state guarantee for “eligible liabilities,” 
which are all deposits except retail deposits of up to EU€100,000, and it will expire at 
midnight on September 29, 2015).  
120. See Anne Seith, EU Too Slow to Provide Answers in Financial Crisis, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/knee-jerk-
reactions-eu-too-slow-to-provide-answers-in-financial-crisis-a-582526-druck.html 
(characterizing the ELG as a “knee-jerk response”); Avellaneda & Hardiman, supra note 58, at 
18 (characterizing the decision as an imperfect one made under the pressure of a deepening 
crisis). See generally COOPER, supra note 66 (adopting the view that the Irish government’s 
2014]              NOT JUST THE LUCK OF THE IRISH 1881 

debt required Ireland to cut its public spending significantly; many 
citizens lost their pensions.121 Although the ELG worked for a while, 
the national debt continued to rise at an alarming rate to 32% of 
Ireland’s GDP.122 As the national debt hit unsustainable levels, global 
speculation increased and persisted for weeks about when Ireland 
would request a bailout from the IMF.123 On November 21, 2010, the 
Irish government announced that it had requested financial assistance 
through a joint program between the European Union and the IMF.124  
This announcement did not immediately resolve Ireland’s economic 
issues, and it triggered several weeks of contentious negotiations, as 
the other countries and institutions tried to limit their own 
exposure.125 For example, the European Central Bank (“ECB”) 
refused to offer Ireland a bank bailout because it did not want to set a 

decision to bail out the banks using tax payer money was a mistake the plummeted Ireland’s 
economy further into crisis). 
121. Bail-out Q&A, supra note 9 (explaining that the Irish government contributed 
EU€17.5 billion drawing from its reserves and the National Pension Reserve Fund. The IMF 
provided EU€22.5 billion, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) contributed 
EU€17.5 billion, and the UK, Sweden, and Denmark provided bilateral loans); COOPER, supra 
note 66, at 129 (explaining that the government reduced the cost of pension by implementing a 
pay freeze for state pensioners until 2015 and by determining pensions for new state 
employees based on career-average earnings instead of final salary and that age qualifications 
for pensions will continue to rise until 2028). 
122. Budget Ireland 2011, supra note 10 (reporting recent findings from the Irish 
Department of Finance); Murray-Brown & Dennis, supra note 115 (describing the effect of the 
ELG on the Irish national debt); Irish Deficit Balloons After new Bank Bail-out, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-11441473 (reporting the Irish debt level 
as 32% of GDP); see also COOPER, supra note 66, at 50-57 (describing the political pressures 
present in Ireland as the country tried to complete the ELG).  
123. See, e.g., Eurogroup ministers discuss Ireland money crisis, CNN (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/11/16/ireland.economy/ (reporting that Ireland has no 
immediate funding needs and speculating about the pressure it was under to request a bailout); 
Neil Hume, Statement by the Eurogroup on Ireland, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2010/11/16/406886/statement-by-the-eurogroup-on-ireland/ 
(characterizing the fact that Ireland had not yet requested a bailout as a “standoff”); see also   
Fore l l e  & Enr ich ,  supra  no te  13  (giving an account of the Irish economic situation 
through early November 2010, before the EU announced a bailout of Irish banks). 
124. See Government statement on request for support, RTE NEWS (Nov. 21, 2010), 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1121/294654-economy3/ (reporting that European ministers 
began talks on how to resolve the financial troubles of Ireland, even as the Republic denied 
that it was facing default and had asked for help). 
125. See Avelleneda & Hardiman, supra note 58 (contextualizing Ireland’s capacity to 
devise a response to the crisis within the fragmentation of the larger European Union and its 
weak coordinating capacity); see also COOPER, supra note 66, at 9 (analyzing Ireland’s 
experience trying to obtain relief); Breen, supra note 8, at 5 (categorizing the relative power of 
IMF member nations according to their status as shareholders). 
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precedent for other members and their banks.126 France and Germany 
were also strongly opposed to an ECB bailout because it would 
cripple their bigger banks that were significantly exposed to multiple 
Eurozone economies through lending.127 The United Kingdom was 
also not willing or able to offer any meaningful external relief as 
many of its assets were tied up with Irish ones.128 Additionally, 
because Germany and France are the IMF’s largest European 
shareholders, no features of the austerity program could run contrary 
to their national interests.129  
2. Ireland’s Austerity Program 
Ireland signed the MoU with the IMF and the European Union 
on December 7, 2010.130 Through the MoU, the European Union and 
the IMF agreed to provide Ireland with financial assistance that was 
conditional on fulfilling the requirements of the austerity program.131 
The MoU divided the rescue funds into quarterly installments and 
required Ireland to meet certain austerity goals in order to receive 
each installment of the loan.132 In January 2011, four months after 
debt levels had skyrocketed, Ireland received its first loan payment 

126. See COOPER, supra note 66, at 120-26 (explaining the effect of the European 
countries’ exposure to Ireland in the negotiations); see also Breen, supra note 8, at 7-9 
(explaining that ECB, the EU, France, and Germany were “united” in their desire to avoid 
creditor losses through haircuts.)  
127. See COOPER, supra note 66, at 120-21 (explaining the effect of the European 
countries’ exposure to Ireland in the negotiations); see also Breen, supra note 8, at 8 
(attributing France and Germany’s influence as “key shareholders” of the ECB to the 
institution’s refusal to offer Ireland meaningful relief). 
128.  See COOPER, supra note 66, at 123 (discussing the large amount of British assets 
tied up in Ireland; see also Breen, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining the UK’s attitude towards 
Ireland in the context of the economic and historical ties between the nations).  
129. See Breen, supra note 8, at 5 (categorizing the relative power of IMF member 
nations according to their status as shareholders); IMF Voting, supra note 96 (explaining the 
relative power of member nations through the voting process). 
130. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11 (detailing Ireland’s 
requirements to receive each payment); see also Bail-out Q&A, supra note 9 (outlining the 
program). 
131. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11, at 59 (stating that the European 
Union and the IMF will provide financial assistance to Ireland if it complies with specific 
policies); see also Bail-out Q&A, supra note 9 (reporting on the basic facts of the bail-out). 
132. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11, at 26 (characterizing such 
austerity measures as “ambitious but realistic fiscal consolidation” to restore financial 
stability); see also Bail-out Q&A, supra note 9 (providing the general timeline for the austerity 
program). 
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after Dáil Éireann, the Irish legislature, published the 2011 Finance 
Bill imposing the required austerity measures.133  
 The most significant requirement was the austerity measures 
Ireland was required to impose in the name of fiscal consolidation.134 
The program required Ireland to cut public spending by decreasing 
food subsidies, wages, minimum wage, unemployment benefits, and 
pension benefits, in addition to imposing an unprecedented property 
tax.135 Due to the governing structure of the IMF, these policies were 
created with significant input from Ireland’s creditors whose interests 
prevented them from offering Ireland any other relief.136  
3. Ireland Today 
The official sector, as well as the CRAs, supports the view that 
Ireland has recovered from its sovereign debt crisis.137 It has not.138 
When the European Union and the IMF authorized the disbursement 
of their final payments to Ireland, European Union President José 
Manuel Barroso stated, “Ireland's success sends an important 
message—that with determination and support from partner countries 
we can and will emerge stronger from this deep crisis.”139 Laudatory 
statements aside, such a “milestone” is not reflective of the health of 

133. See Budget Ireland 2011, supra note 10 (reporting on the Minister’ presentation of 
Budget 2011); Irish Finance Bill 2011, supra note 12 (reporting on the measures contained in 
the bill); Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11, at 59 (stating that the adoption of the 
budget will trigger release the first disbursement of payment).  
134. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11 (characterizing such austerity 
measures as “ambitious fiscal adjustment to restore fiscal sustainability”); see also Ireland sets 
out record austerity budget, supra note 13 (reporting on the budget the Irish government 
designed to comply with the austerity program and deeming it “the toughest budget on 
record”). 
135. See Ireland sets out record austerity budget, supra note 13 (detailing specific cuts 
in the budget); see also COOPER, supra note 66, at 129 (showing that these austerity measures 
were imposed in addition to previous government spending cuts necessitated by the ELG). 
136. See IMF voting, supra note 96 (demonstrating specific countries’ relative power 
through voting); COOPER, supra note 66, at 120-126 (explaining countries’ behavior in 
negotiations as reflective of their financial exposure to Irish debt). 
137.  See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the praise Ireland 
received from the IMF and the increase in its credit ratings).  
138. See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text (highlighting Ireland’s dismal 
economic conditions such as its unemployment and emigration rate). 
139. See European Commission, President Barroso welcomes Ireland's exit from its 
assistance programme, Press Releases Database MEMO/13/1149 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-1149_en.htm. (providing the transcript of the statement); Barroso 
congratulates Ireland, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2009),  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
8288586.stm (providing a video of President Barroso’s remarks). 
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the Republic; it merely indicates that Ireland has managed to meet the 
terms of the austerity program.140 In fact, Moody’s upgrade was based 
on: (1) the growth potential of the economy, which is expected to 
reduce government debt ratios with ongoing austerity; and (2) the 
government's exit from the austerity program on schedule, with 
restored market access.141  
Ireland is still suffering despite completing its participation in 
the austerity program; property values, wages, and employment rates 
remain low.142 The IMF’s austerity measures continue to impact Irish 
citizens who are seriously affected by the elimination of 
unemployment assistance, minimum wage reduction, and pension 
cuts.143 Moreover, Ireland is still experiencing low levels of market 
confidence in its bonds and is faced with the prospect of a long period 
of economic hardship.144 Ireland continues to be plagued by the costs 
of the current system of sovereign debt restructuring: economic harm 
such as reputational damage and large deficits exacerbated by the 
costs of negotiations.145 These losses, combined with the harsh 

140.  See 2013 Review, supra note 14 (referring to Ireland’s progress as a milestone); 
see also Ireland’s tough economic policies to continue, says finance minister, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25362493 (both announcing Ireland’s 
then imminent departure from the IMF bailout); see Castle, supra note 20 (analyzing future 
hardship Ireland will face). 
141. See Rating Action: Moody's upgrades Ireland's sovereign ratings to Baa3/P-3: 
outlook changed to positive, Moody’s Investor Services (Jan. 17, 2014), 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-upgrades-Irelands-sovereign-ratings-to-Baa3P-3-
outlook-changed--PR_290559 (explaining the dual bases for the ratings increase); supra note 
18 and accompanying text (contextualizing Ireland’s new rating of Baa3 on the rating scale 
that goes up to the highest possible AAA rating which Ireland held prior to the crisis). 
142. See O’Toole, supra note 20 (differentiating between Ireland’s global economy 
which has remained “robust” and its domestic economy which still remains weak); Ireland’s 
tough economic policies to continue, says finance minister, supra note 140 (reporting that 
Ireland’s economy is not strong enough for the government to relax austerity measures). 
143. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing to a detailed list of cuts); 2013 
Review, supra note 14 (discusing the policies Ireland will continue despite the end of the 
bailout); see supra note 143 and accompanying text (explaining that tight budgetary 
constraints will persist).  
144. See Castle, supra note 20, at 1-2 (reporting that the Irish economy is still very 
vulnerable as the euro remains fragile, and pointing out that Ireland is not due to pay off its 
international loans until the year 2042); O’Toole, supra note 20, at 3-4 (citing the fact that 
many young Irish professionals are leaving the country as evidence of poor economic 
prospects, and noting that the economy has only grown by half of the IMF’s projected 5.25%). 
See generally Pagones, supra note 80 (arguing that IMF-imposed austerity measures in Greece 
similarly had harmful effects on the Greek domestic economy).  
145. See Seith, supra note 12 (noting that stalled negotiations weaken confidence in 
markets, further frustrating economic conditions); see also Avellaneda & Hardiman, supra 
note 58, at 14 (noting that larger countries with more stable economies, i.e. Germany can 
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austerity measures that the European Union and the IMF required, 
will affect Irish citizens for decades.146 Ireland’s experience illustrates 
the current systemic issues in both the process of restructuring and its 
solution of IMF rescue programs. 
B. Comparing Statutory and Contractual Reform Proposals 
This Section examines the two main types of sovereign debt 
reforms. Section B.1 gives an overview of the breadth of proposals 
advocating for statutory reform by implementing an international 
bankruptcy regime. Section B.2 elucidates opportunities for reform 
within the language of sovereign debt contracts, referred to as 
contractual reform.  
1. An International Bankruptcy Regime 
The main statutory reform proposal in the sovereign debt context 
is to create an international bankruptcy regime.147 Many scholars and 
practitioners favor the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(“SDRM”) approach, which would serve as a bankruptcy mechanism 
allowing the IMF to oversee sovereign debt transactions outside the 
context of a bailout or restructuring.148  To oversee the SDRM, the 
IMF would create an international bankruptcy court where a 
disinterested party would adjudicate lenders’ claims of repayment.149 
Such a court would be similar to the World Trade Organization 
arbitration process for trade disputes.150 
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better afford to engage in lengthy policy disputes); see also Breen, supra note 8, at 1 
(highlighting the lack of credibility of the IMF’s recovery program because even the IMF 
knew it would not put Ireland on a sustainable path to recovery). 
146. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining the IMF’s requirements).  
147. See, e.g., infra note 150 and accompanying text (citing the wealth of bankruptcy 
regime proposals).  
148. See Brenneman, supra note 31, at 692-93 (comparing different proposals); see 
Tarullo, supra note 60, at 303 (discussing different features in these proposals); see SDRM 
2002, supra note 74, at 6-9 (articulating a recent SDRM proposal by IMF leadership).  
149. Sedlak, supra note 45, at 1494 (discussing the IMF’s goal of creating a more 
orderly process). See generally SDRM 2002, supra note 74 (discussing the limitation of 
enforcement of sovereign debt by existing courts).  
150. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements of Disputes, 
WTO, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdfWTO (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2014) (setting forth the process for WTO dispute settlement); see also Tarullo, supra 
note 60, at 291 (explaining how the WTO administers its rules through an independent, quasi-
judicial proceeding). 
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The IMF proposed creating an independent framework to handle 
future sovereign debt problems through an international version of a 
domestic bankruptcy code.151 The IMF’s proposals have been 
structured with an eye towards a defined set of issues: (1) preventing 
creditors from obtaining relief through national courts; (2) providing a 
guarantee that the debtor country would act responsibly during the 
course of a stall in the restructuring; (3) encouraging private lenders 
to provide fresh money; and (4) restructuring agreements should bind 
all of the parties not only the majority that has agreed.152  
In addition to modeling the SDRM on domestic bankruptcy 
proceedings, drafters have proposed several other procedures. For 
example, some drafts have required that the IMF officially certify that 
a country’s debts are unsustainable before allowing a restructuring to 
occur.153 Other versions borrow from bankruptcy law and suggest 
giving the IMF access to tools such as standstills, adjudication, cram-
down authority, and priority financing.154 Thus, the SDRM approach 
and other statutory proposals enhance the IMF’s involvement in 
sovereign debt lending and restructuring.155  
2. Reforming Contractual Terms 
Contract reform proposals focus on amending the restructuring 
process through the language in debt agreements. For example, an 

151. Lee Buchheit, Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 10 Bus. L. 
Int'l 205, 342 (2009) (seeing this as modernizing change is needed since “gunboat captains” 
can no longer enforce sovereign debt arrangements); see also Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, 
at 178-79 (pointing out that in addition to solving the problem of sovereign debt restructuring, 
such a reform could also result in an even larger role for the IMF in restructurings). See 
generally SDRM 2002, supra note 74 (laying out the IMF’s proposal). 
152.  Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 633-34 (analyzing the four key issues to be 
addressed by the IMF’s proposal); id. (confirming the IMF’s prioritization of issue (1)).  
153. Tarullo, supra note 60, at 301 (explaining that such a requirement is an effort to 
maintain the practice of good macro-economic policies on the part of the IMF); Brenneman, 
supra note 31, at 692-93 (describing proposals’ efforts to prevent debtors from 
opportunistically invoking restructuring clauses).  
154. Tarullo, supra note 60, at 303 (explaining how these mechanisms would be re-
configured to the case of sovereign debt). Standstills would suspend the legal obligation to 
repay debts during some period of workout efforts. Adjudication includes decisions such as 
how to group creditors into classes for scheduling purposes. Cram-down authority would force 
creditors to accept a rescheduling or reduction of the debt they hold. With priority financing, 
lenders could make new funds available to the sovereign and be entitled to repayment of the 
entire amount before any debt assumed prior to the sovereign “bankruptcy” can be repaid. See 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 1978) (providing the text of Chapter 11). 
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining how these proposals would 
give the IMF power to oversee the court). 
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increasing number of debt contracts have started to use collective 
action clauses (“CACs”).156 Such clauses replace the UAC and permit 
creditors to amend debt agreements with super majority support, 
usually 75%, instead of the unanimous support required in UACs.157 
Designed to prevent holdouts by enabling a super majority to approve 
changes in payment, CACs can facilitate restructurings more easily 
than UACs.158  
The US Treasury has offered its own variation of contract 
reform.159 Its approach to CACs is that only the creditors could 
initiate a restructuring after a super-majority vote.160 Other examples 
of contractual reforms include clauses that specify the jurisdiction 
where claims will be adjudicated or a clause that would give 
sovereigns the legal right to begin restructuring when certain 
conditions are met.161 

156. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 181 (detailing the growing acceptance and use of 
these terms). See generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate 
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004) (finding 
that since the end of 2003, nearly every new issuance of sovereign bonds has featured a CAC).  
157. Bolton & Skeel, supra note50, at 181 (detailing the growing acceptance and use of 
these terms); see Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 650 (comparing different proposals based 
on the CAC template); see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 156 (finding that since the end of 
2003, nearly every new issuance of sovereign bonds has featured a CAC). 
158. Sergio J. Galvis & Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and 
Challenges Ahead, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 713, 714-15 (2004) (stating that the inclusion of CACs 
into bond contracts represents substantial progress in the effort to facilitate orderly 
restructurings); Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 4 (analyzing the difference in the odds of a 
UAC and CAC in allowing a sovereign to obtain the necessary support in a growing, global 
financial market).  
159. John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the 
Conference, Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?, Institute for International 
Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm 
(discussing further details to be decided on at the time of the agreement). See generally Sedlak, 
supra note 45 (analyzing various U.S. Treasury reform proposals both contractual and 
statutory).  
160. Sedlak, supra note 45, at 1501 (discussing the specifics of one of the Treasury’s 
variations); see Michelle J. White, Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?, 2002 
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 287, 308 (criticizing CAC proposals because they were 
extremely similar to already proposed and unworkable plans).  
161. Compare Brenneman, supra note 31, at 688-92 (providing an example of another 
contractual reform targeting certainty in the restructuring process), with Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 31, at 644-45 (analyzing other proposals, such as variation of the market-based 
SDRM). 
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The language in sovereign debt contracts is a target for reform 
because these contractual provisions usually become boilerplate.162 
Further, the lack of detail in current agreements often necessitates 
further ex post coordination, such as determining whether a 
restructuring is necessary and when the debtor will repay the 
lenders.163 Thus, contractual reforms seek to reduce such procedural 
gridlock by amending the language that parties negotiate and sign ex 
ante, before any sign or pressure of an economic crisis.164 
International legal precedent makes it likely that contracts will 
continue to be important tools in sovereign debt relations.165 
III. A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION: IMPROVING THE 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS USING CONTRACT TO MINIMIZE 
CRISIS TIME VARIABLES 
This Part argues that the best reform method involves contract 
reform. More specifically, a provision should be added to contracts 
that identifies an economic indicator to automatically trigger 
restructuring negotiations. This contractual mechanism would be 
inserted into bond contracts ex ante to create a well-organized process 
that aligns interests of both creditors and debtors.166 Part III.A 
explains why contractual reform is a better option for reform and 
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162. Weidemaier, supra note 100 (explaining the prominence of boilerplate language in 
debt agreements); see Choi & Gulati, supra note 156 (finding that since the end of 2003, 
nearly every new issuance of sovereign bonds has featured a CAC). 
163. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 3 (stating that use of this boilerplate term is 
a significant barrier to the success of negotiations); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50 (stating that 
this was the case until Mexico’s 2003 bond issuance).   
164. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 630 (stressing the need for a rethinking of 
the existing sovereign debt restructuring procedures and mechanisms, and analyzing others 
that are being considered); Brenneman, supra note 31, at 19 (stating the importance of ex ante 
action for its own insolvency and restructuring procedures). 
165. See, e.g., Allied II, supra note 73 (holding the Central Bank of Costa Rica’s refusal 
to authorize payment of promissory notes to the United States would be inconsistent with 
orderly resolution of debt issues); James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan 
Contracts and Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 251, 252 
(2006) (“Since Allied II, equitable, statutory, and affirmative defenses to sovereign default 
were virtually extinguished as every sovereign debt default became susceptible to being 
construed as a unilateral restructuring of sovereign debt contracts, a repudiation, or a taking 
that violated the sanctity of the underlying contractual obligation to repay under the loan 
contract.”). 
166. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 31, at 631 (advocating this as a priority in light of 
increasingly diverse creditors); see also SDRM 2002, supra note 74 (advocating a similar 
focus).   
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details the proposed term. Part III.B explains why this term is 
preferable and necessary in light of other reform proposals. 
A. The Plan: Adding a Trigger Term to Sovereign Debt Contracts 
Debt agreements should contain a contractual provision to 
dictate when a sovereign will begin restructuring.167 Parties would 
negotiate ex ante and agree on an economic trigger that would make 
restructuring negotiations automatic.168 The provisions would also 
include a time limit within which the restructuring would have to 
occur otherwise creditors lose their right to repayment.169 For 
example, in the case of Ireland, when the property bubble sent shocks 
through the economy, Ireland could have been contractually obligated 
to restructure instead of trying to avoid it with the ELG.170 Section 
A.1 argues that contractual reform is a better method of reform 
because it can have far-reaching effects on the entire process by 
aligning parties’ interests. Section A.2 discusses how agreeing upon a 
time to restructure ex ante would result in more efficient negotiations 
and consequently will help sovereigns regain access to capital 
markets more easily. 
1. The Benefits of Contractual Reform 
Contractual reform provides the opportunity for parties to 
disclose and agree upon the process of default or restructuring, not 
just their ultimate demands.171 A contractual solution would give 
creditors a key role in drafting the agreement with an economic 
trigger, thus reducing fears of moral hazard.172 The provision would 
also specify a number of days after discussions open within which the 
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167. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (establishing that early restructurings 
are in the sovereigns’ best interests).  
168. Brenneman, supra note 31, at 19 (stating the importance of ex ante action); 
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 55 (highlighting details contracts currently lack). 
169. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (establishing the importance of 
timeliness in light of the disruption legally protected holdout creditors cause). 
170. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (explaining the economic factors 
that preceded the ELG). 
171. See Brenneman, supra note 31, at 703 (advocating that such a solution would likely 
alleviate high interest rates currently caused by uncertainty); supra notes 75-91 and 
accompanying text (explaining and citing to identifying features of current process that result 
in unnecessary costs to the sovereign).  
172. See Brenneman, supra note 31, at 687 (arguing that this change will reduce moral 
hazard as opposed to an SDRM proposal where the IMF is setting the term); Bratton & Gulati, 
supra note 49, at 30 (stating that IMF also supports a contractual mechanism for this reason).  
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parties must agree upon a restructuring plan, enabling orderly ex post 
cooperation by aligning their interests.173 Any holdout behavior would 
forfeit a lender’s legal right to repayment, thus incentivizing them to 
cooperate.174  
Under this plan, a sovereign would clear its biggest obstacle 
before the crisis occurs: getting creditors to agree on restructuring 
terms.175 An ex ante restructuring strategy is preferable because 
parties are more likely to make well-informed decisions before a 
crisis happens rather than afterwards.176 This would give parties the 
opportunity to make informed policy and economic choices without 
the pressure of a continuing panic.177 Further, contractual reform is 
easy to implement, as the language can simply be inserted into future 
contracts, keeping the cost of reform low and increasing the 
likelihood of use.178 
2. Contracting Around Uncertainty: The Trigger Term 
Economic indicators are attractive triggers because they are 
objective.179 Parties could choose a specific indicator based on the 
relevant concerns and characteristics of that agreement.180 They could 
use indicators such as GDP, debt-to-GDP ratio, export-to-import 
ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio for triggers.181 There is already a 
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173. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 30 (discussing the desirability of this 
transfer of the burden); see Brenneman, supra note 31, at 687 (explaining how this would align 
sovereign and creditor interests through drafting). 
174. SDRM 2002, supra note 74, at 2 (specifying a lack incentives for countries to 
resolve unsustainable debt burdens “promptly and in an orderly way” as one of the main 
problems in the current system); see supra note 77 and accompanying text (identifying the 
common delays in restructurings as a major impediment to a sovereign’s recovery).  
175. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text (citing examples of other proposals 
with this focus).  
176. Brenneman, supra note 31, at 685 (arguing that decisions made before a crisis can 
be more efficient as analogized to domestic bankruptcy); see Feibelman, supra note 75, at 732 
(demonstrating the need for a contractual term to make ex post relief easier by eliminating 
disorderly workouts which drain a sovereign’s funds). 
177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (citing proposals with similar priorities); 
see also Avellaneda & Hardiman, supra note 58, at 17 (discussing the pressure of crisis time 
decisions as seen in the European Union context).  
178. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (discussing the example of CACs). 
179. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (illustrating the need for this in 
light of the IMF’s political character).  
180. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text; Gulati & Triantis, supra note 62, 
at 985 (proposing the use of such indicators).  
181. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (showing how much indicators will 
solve a current problem in the restructuring process).  
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significant amount of research and analysis on which economic 
factors can be used to determine the likelihood of a default.182 Parties 
could choose to condition a restructuring on the occurrence of a single 
event, such as a certain debt-to-GDP level, or they could use an 
average over time, allowing more flexibility for unexpected factors 
while still keeping the process objective.183  
By reducing the costs of negotiation, the trigger term preserves 
the sovereign’s future access to capital.184 Agreement on a pre-
determined trigger would eliminate drawn out negotiations, 
minimizing direct expenses.185 A more orderly restructuring process 
would also protect the sovereign from reputational damage caused by 
external actors such as CRAs.186 By reducing the overall cost of the 
restructuring, the trigger term would alleviate sovereigns’ hesitance to 
restructure.187  
Trigger terms could also curb the damaging influences of 
CRAs.188 If the likelihood of a default was clear and identifiable 
through a specified trigger, creditors would be better able to anticipate 
their risks without CRAs.189 The market would likely give priority to 
bonds issued by sovereigns with more reliable economic reputations 

182. Compare Brenneman, supra note 31, at 693, and Sedlak, supra note 45, at 1489 
(both discussing suggested factors to clearly determine when a “credit event” or “unsustainable 
debt” is present), with IMF Policy, supra note 67 (evidencing that the IMF has actually 
suggested using triggers within the current system however, it would make use of rating 
triggers for credit ratings agencies, however, still reflecting a preference for economic triggers 
of a country’s economic viability and for these triggers to be objective).  
183. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text (illustrating the need for and 
research conducted on the use of indicators); Tarullo, supra note 60 (discussing the preference 
for flexibility in reforms).  
184. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (evidencing the effect of debt 
defaults on a sovereign’s access to capital); supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text 
(describing how this happened in Ireland). 
185. Dickerson, supra note 34, at 1011-12; see also, Brenneman, supra note 31, at 693 
(discussing the values of quick, orderly workouts).  
186. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (explaining the usual peripheral 
involvement of CRAs and the major impact it can have); see also supra note 5 and 
accompanying text (illustrating the impact on Ireland). 
187. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (attributing delayed restructurings to 
current systemic costs that this term would be alleviating); see also, Sedlak, supra note 45, at 
1497 (arguing within the context of the SDRM, quick and predictable workouts reduce overall 
restructuring costs).  
188. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining these damaging influences). 
189. Feibelman, supra note 75, at 731 (explaining the desirability of an identifiable 
standard for sovereign debt with respect to odious debt); see supra note 183 and accompanying 
text (citing the advantages of economic indicators). 
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based on publicly available indicators, reducing the importance of 
ratings.190    
The trigger also would allow sovereigns to construct 
restructuring solutions aside from IMF-led austerity programs. IMF 
programs and participation may still be necessary as sovereigns will 
still default, and the IMF remains a powerful institution financially 
capable of providing large funds.191 The trigger term, however, would 
change the IMF’s involvement by eliminating its current referee role 
by contractually obligating sovereigns and creditors to negotiate 
directly.192 
B. Why the Trigger Term is Better than Extant Proposals 
The trigger term is preferable to existing reform proposals, such 
as the SDRM. The SDRM increases the role of the IMF in sovereign 
debt restructurings.193 By implementing a more rule-based system the 
SDRM could make the process appear more neutral and predictable; 
however, such a change could prove to be only cosmetic because the 
IMF would maintain its political structure.194 Further, without 
decreasing IMF involvement in a restructuring it is not clear that there 
would be any effect on the timing of restructurings or the possibility 
of moral hazard.195  
While contractual terms are effective in amending the 
restructuring process, CACs alone are insufficient because they do not 
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190. Feibelman, supra note 75, at 731 (explaining that in making an debt standard 
predictable, the market will segment itself between different calibers of investment); see also 
Bratton & Gulati, supra note 49, at 25 (explaining that despite the type of proposal, the best 
interest of creditors results from their assent, thus a goal should be to facilitate creditor 
choices). 
191. See, e.g., supra notes 1-4, 118-22 and accompanying text (providing an example of 
a far-reaching regional economic crisis); see also Sedlak, supra note 45, at 1485 (providing a 
brief history of sovereign debt and its incentives on both sides). 
192. See supra notes 100-111 and accompanying text (explaining the IMF’s role in the 
current system and the conflicts it creates). 
193. See supra notes 152-156 (explaining the SDRM and the enhanced role it would give 
the IMF).   
194. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 201 (explaining that even those who favor the 
IMF’s current role feel that the IMF’s SDRM proposal is incomplete in that it does not address 
the following issues with such a plan, if desired: the absence of a coherent priority scheme; the 
need for an interim financing strategy that refines and alters the role of the IMF; and the need 
for an independent decision maker to oversee the sovereign bankruptcy framework); see also 
id. (elucidating the desirability of addressing these fundamental issues).  
195. See generally supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (explaining the occurrence 
of downgrades in the current system and their effects).  
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set out any parameters for restructuring before a default occurs.196 
CAC proposals generally only address how creditors will amend the 
payment terms after a default or crisis.197 The trigger term on the 
other hand, has the potential to bring about system-wide reform. 
CONCLUSION 
The practice of sovereign debt fundraising is not going to 
diminish in the foreseeable future, as nations need access to capital. 
Currently, sovereign debt restructurings impose prohibitive costs on 
the sovereign, making it harder and harder for sovereigns to regain 
access to capital markets. Consistent IMF bailouts exacerbate the 
problem as they remove any incentive for the parties to negotiate, as 
happened in Ireland. The Irish case provides a tangible example of the 
current conflicts inherent to debt restructurings and their mammoth 
costs to the sovereign. 
This Note proposed a contractual term to be inserted into bond 
contracts to determine when a sovereign should begin restructuring. 
The parties would negotiate ex ante and agree on an economic trigger 
at which restructuring would automatically begin. There would be a 
time limit within which the restructuring would have to occur, 
deterring holdout creditors. A more efficient agreement between 
parties would appropriately minimize the role of the IMF and other 
actors. This would alleviate current costs of restructuring by reducing 
uncertainty and prolonged negotiations, making it easier for countries 
to recover from economic crises. Go nÉirí an tÁdh Libh.198  
 
 


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196. Brenneman, supra note 31, at 689 (arguing that the CAC is too flexible to constitute 
reform on its own); see also Bolton & Skeel, supra note 50, at 182 (arguing that CACs still do 
not address the procedural issue of standstill during restructuring negotiations).  
197. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (highlighting CACs’ lack of reforms to 
the restructuring process). 
198. May your luck rise, Ireland. 
